<DOCUMENT>
<TYPE>EX-99.3
<SEQUENCE>2
<FILENAME>e27693ex99_3.txt
<DESCRIPTION>LETTER TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
<TEXT>
                                                             Page 32 of 33 Pages

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.3

                          Barington Capital Group, L.P.
                               888 Seventh Avenue
                            New York, New York 10019

June 22, 2007

Board of Directors
Lancaster Colony Corporation
37 West Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215

To the Board of Directors of Lancaster Colony Corporation:

We have been  disappointed with the profitability and share price performance of
Lancaster Colony  Corporation under the leadership of John B. Gerlach,  Jr., the
Company's Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President.  We have
therefore  suggested  to him a number of  measures  that we believe  will create
significant value for the benefit of the Company's public shareholders.

The continued  underperformance of the Company since we initially proposed these
measures  over 14 months ago has  compelled  us to reach out to you - given your
fiduciary  duty to all  Lancaster  shareholders  - as we  question  whether  Mr.
Gerlach  will ever make any  substantive  changes to the company he runs and his
family effectively controls.

While  the  Gerlach  family  founded  Lancaster  Colony  Corporation  and is the
Company's largest shareholder, Lancaster is a publicly-traded corporation, not a
privately-owned  family business.  Unfortunately,  it seems as if the Company is
being run as if it was.

Mr. Gerlach is not only the Company's Chief Executive Officer,  he has also been
appointed  Chairman of the Board,  the governing body  responsible for selecting
and  overseeing  the  performance  of the CEO.  This was done  without  even the
designation  of a  permanent  lead  independent  director  as  a  countervailing
measure.

Even  more  concerning,   however,   is  the  Company's  veritable  fortress  of
anti-takeover defenses. These defenses include a staggered board of directors, a
"poison  pill"  rights  plan  with  a  15%  trigger  that  was  adopted  without
shareholder approval, "blank check" preferred stock and the ability of the Board
to add  directors  without  shareholder  approval.  In addition,  the  Company's
articles of incorporation deny shareholders the right to cumulate their votes in
the  election  of  directors  and  require  that  shareholders  obtain  Board or
shareholder approval prior to acquiring 20%, 33% and 50% ownership thresholds in
the Company,  despite the existence of the Company's  "poison pill" rights plan.
Furthermore,  the Company has an 80%  supermajority  vote requirement to approve
certain  business  combinations  and amend  various  provisions in the Company's
articles of incorporation and regulations,  effectively giving the Gerlachs, who
hold approximately 26% of the Company's common stock, a blocking  position.  All
these defenses

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                                                             Page 33 of 33 Pages

are in addition to the business combination,  fair price, disgorgement and other
provisions that protect  Lancaster and all other  corporations  organized in the
State of Ohio.

We believe that the numerous  defenses the Company has in place are excessive(1)
and demonstrate a disregard for the interests of Lancaster's public shareholders
by  facilitating  the  entrenchment  of the  Company's  directors  and executive
officers  and  minimizing  the  influence  that  shareholders  (other  than  the
Gerlachs) have on the Board. In our opinion this is not only inappropriate,  but
likely  damaging to  shareholder  value as many studies have  demonstrated  that
companies that have good corporate  governance in these areas tend to outperform
those that do not.(2)

It is our hope  that,  upon  reflection,  you  will  concur  that the  Company's
financial  performance and corporate  governance  record is unacceptable and see
that  meaningful  improvements  are  promptly  made so that  Lancaster  not only
becomes  a leader  in the area of  corporate  governance,  but also  returns  to
historical levels of profitability and share price performance.

Sincerely,

/s/ James A. Mitarotonda
--------------------------------
James A. Mitarotonda

----------
(1) Institutional  Shareholder Services ("ISS"), a leading provider of corporate
governance and proxy voting  services,  currently  rates the Company's  takeover
defenses with a score of 1 out of 5,  indicating  that the  Company's  corporate
governance  practices  in this area are in the bottom  quintile  relative to the
Company's  peers as  identified  by ISS.  Overall,  73% of the  companies in the
Standard  & Poor's 400 Index  outperform  the  Company in the area of  corporate
governance according to ISS's most recent index ranking of the Company.

(2)  See,  e.g.,  Bebchuk,   Cohen  and  Ferrell,   What  Matters  in  Corporate
Governance?,  Harvard  Law School  John M. Olin  Center for Law,  Economics  and
Business  Discussion Paper No. 491 (September  2004)(identifying a statistically
significant correlation between stock performance and the degree to which boards
are  accountable to their  shareholders);  Institutional  Shareholder  Services,
Better   Corporate   Governance   Results  in  Higher   Profit  and  Lower  Risk
(2005)("Companies  with  better  corporate  governance  have lower  risk  better
profitability and higher valuation. More specifically,  these well-run companies
outperform poorly governed firms in return on investment, annual dividend yield,
net profit  margin,  and  price-to-earnings  ratio.").  See also  Eisenhofer and
Levin,  Investment  Returns:  Does  Corporate  Governance  Matter to  Investment
Returns?,  Corporate  Accountability  Report,  Vol.  3, No.  57  (September  23,
2005)("[E]mpirical  evidence  suggests  what common  sense tells us is correct -
those corporate boards that are more concerned about shareholder rights are also
better guardians of shareholder money").

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