EX-99.CORP.GOV 6 d831012dex99corpgov.htm GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES & ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

BlackRock

Investment

Stewardship

Global Corporate Governance &

Engagement Principles

January 2020

Contents

Introduction to BlackRock |  |  | 3 |
Philosophy on corporate governance |  |  | 3 |
Corporate governance, engagement and voting |  |  | 4 |
Boards and directors |  |  | 5 |
Auditors and audit-related issues |  |  | 6 |
Capital structure, mergers, asset sales and other special transactions |  |  | 6 |
Compensation and benefits |  |  | 7 |
Environmental and social issues |  |  | 7 |
General corporate governance matters and shareholder protections |  |  | 9 |
BlackRock’s oversight of our investment stewardship activities |  |  | 9 |
Vote execution |  |  | 10 |
Conflicts management policies and procedures |  |  | 10 |
Voting guidelines |  |  | 11 |
Reporting and vote transparency |  |  | 12 |

If you would like additional information, please contact:

ContactStewardship@blackrock.com

BLACKROCK

Introduction to BlackRock

BlackRock’s purpose is to help more and more people experience financial well-being. As a fiduciary to our clients, we provide the investment and technology solutions they need when planning for their most important goals. We manage assets on behalf of institutional and individual clients, across a full spectrum of investment strategies, asset classes and regions. Our client base includes pension plans, endowments, foundations, charities, official institutions, insurers and other financial institutions, as well as individuals around the world.

Philosophy on corporate governance

BlackRock Investment Stewardship (“BIS”) activities are focused on maximizing long-term value for our clients. BIS does this through engagement with boards and management of investee companies and, for those clients who have given us authority, through voting at shareholder meetings.

We believe that there are certain fundamental rights attached to shareholding. Companies and their boards should be accountable to shareholders and structured with appropriate checks and balances to ensure that they operate in shareholders’ best interests. Effective voting rights are central to the rights of ownership and there should be one vote for one share. Shareholders should have the right to elect, remove and nominate directors, approve the appointment of the auditor and to amend the corporate charter or by-laws. Shareholders should be able to vote on matters that are material to the protection of their investment, including but not limited to, changes to the purpose of the business, dilution levels and pre-emptive rights, and the distribution of income and capital structure. In order to make informed decisions, we believe that shareholders have the right to sufficient and timely information.

Our primary focus is on the performance of the board of directors. As the agent of shareholders, the board should set the company’s strategic aims within a framework of prudent and effective controls, which enables risk to be assessed and managed. The board should provide direction and leadership to management and oversee management’s performance. Our starting position is to be supportive of boards in their oversight efforts on shareholders’ behalf and we would generally expect to support the items of business they put to a vote at shareholder meetings. Votes cast against or withheld from resolutions proposed by the board are a signal that we are concerned that the directors or management have either not acted in the best interests of shareholders or have not responded adequately to shareholder concerns. We assess voting matters on a case-by-case basis and in light of each company’s unique circumstances taking into consideration regional best practices and long-term value creation.

These principles set out our approach to engaging with companies, provide guidance on our position on corporate governance and outline how our views might be reflected in our voting decisions. Corporate governance practices can vary internationally, so our expectations in relation to individual companies are based on the legal and regulatory framework of each local market. However, we believe there are overarching principles of corporate governance that apply globally and provide a framework for more detailed, market-specific assessments.

We believe BlackRock has a responsibility in relation to monitoring and providing feedback to companies, sometimes known as “stewardship.” These ownership responsibilities include engaging with management or board members on corporate governance matters, voting proxies in the best long-term economic interests of our clients, and engaging with regulatory bodies to ensure a sound policy framework consistent with promoting long-term shareholder value creation. We also believe in the responsibility to our clients to have appropriate resources and oversight structures. Our approach is set out in the section below titled “BlackRock’s oversight of its investment stewardship activities” and is further detailed in a team profile on our website.

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Corporate governance, engagement and voting

We recognize that accepted standards of corporate governance differ between markets, but we believe there are sufficient common threads globally to identify an overarching set of principles. The objective of our investment stewardship activities is the protection and enhancement of the value of our clients’ investments in public corporations. Thus, these principles focus on practices and structures that we consider to be supportive of long-term value creation. We discuss below the principles under six key themes. In our regional and market-specific voting guidelines we explain how these principles inform our voting decisions in relation to specific resolutions that may appear on the agenda of a shareholder meeting in the relevant market.

The six key themes are:

● Boards and directors

● Auditors and audit-related issues

● Capital structure, mergers, asset sales and other special transactions

● Compensation and benefits

● Environmental and social issues

● General corporate governance matters and shareholder protections

At a minimum, we expect companies to observe the accepted corporate governance standards in their domestic market or to explain why doing so is not in the interests of shareholders. Where company reporting and disclosure is inadequate or the approach taken is inconsistent with our view of what is in the best interests of shareholders, we will engage with the company and/or use our vote to encourage a change in practice. In making voting decisions, we perform independent research and analysis, such as reviewing relevant information published by the company and apply our voting guidelines to achieve the outcome we believe best protects our clients’ long-term economic interests. We also work closely with our active portfolio managers, and may take into account internal and external research.

BlackRock views engagement as an important activity; engagement provides us with the opportunity to improve our understanding of the challenges and opportunities that investee companies are facing and their governance structures. Engagement also allows us to share our philosophy and approach to investment and corporate governance with companies to enhance their understanding of our objectives. Our engagements often focus on providing our feedback on company disclosures, particularly where we believe they could be enhanced. There are a range of approaches we may take in engaging companies depending on the nature of the issue under consideration, the company and the market.

BlackRock’s engagements emphasize direct dialogue with corporate leadership on the governance issues identified in these principles that have a material impact on financial performance. These engagements enable us to cast informed votes aligned with clients’ long-term economic interests. We generally prefer to engage in the first instance where we have concerns and give management time to address or resolve the issue. As a long-term investor, we are patient and persistent in working with our portfolio companies to have an open dialogue and develop mutual understanding of governance matters, to promote the adoption of best practices and to assess the merits of a company’s approach to its governance. We monitor the companies in which we invest and engage with them constructively and privately where we believe doing so helps protect shareholders’ interests. We do not try to micro-manage companies, or tell management and boards what to do. We present our views as a long-term shareholder and listen to companies’ responses. The materiality and immediacy of a given issue will generally determine the level of our engagement and whom we seek to engage at the company, which could be management representatives or board directors.

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Boards and directors

The performance of the board is critical to the economic success of the company and to the protection of shareholders’ interests. Board members serve as agents of shareholders in overseeing the strategic direction and operation of the company. For this reason, BlackRock focuses on directors in many of our engagements and sees the election of directors as one of our most important responsibilities in the proxy voting context.

We expect the board of directors to promote and protect shareholder interests by:

● | establishing an appropriate corporate governance structure

● | supporting and overseeing management in setting long-term strategic goals, applicable measures of value-creation and milestones that will demonstrate progress, and steps taken if any obstacles are anticipated or incurred

● | ensuring the integrity of financial statements

● | making independent decisions regarding mergers, acquisitions and disposals

● | establishing appropriate executive compensation structures

● | addressing business issues, including environmental and social issues, when they have the potential to materially impact company reputation and performance

There should be clear definitions of the role of the board, the committees of the board and senior management such that the responsibilities of each are well understood and accepted. Companies should report publicly the approach taken to governance (including in relation to board structure) and why this approach is in the best interest of shareholders. We will seek to engage with the appropriate directors where we have concerns about the performance of the board or the company, the broad strategy of the company, or the performance of individual board members. We believe that when a company is not effectively addressing a material issue, its directors should be held accountable.

BlackRock believes that directors should stand for re-election on a regular basis. We assess directors nominated for election or re-election in the context of the composition of the board as a whole. There should be detailed disclosure of the relevant credentials of the individual directors in order for shareholders to assess the caliber of an individual nominee. We expect there to be a sufficient number of independent directors on the board to ensure the protection of the interests of all shareholders. Common impediments to independence may include but are not limited to:

● | current or former employment at the company or a subsidiary within the past several years

● | being, or representing, a shareholder with a substantial shareholding in the company

● | interlocking directorships

● | having any other interest, business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company

BlackRock believes that the operation of the board is enhanced when there is a clearly independent, senior non-executive director to chair it or, where the chairman is also the CEO (or is otherwise not independent), an independent lead director. The role of this director is to enhance the effectiveness of the independent members of the board through shaping the agenda, ensuring adequate information is provided to the board and encouraging independent participation in board deliberations. The lead independent board director should be available to shareholders in those situations where a director is best placed to explain and justify a company’s approach.

To ensure that the board remains effective, regular reviews of board performance should be carried out and assessments made of gaps in skills or experience amongst the members. BlackRock believes it is beneficial for new directors to be brought onto the board periodically to refresh the group’s thinking and to ensure both continuity and adequate succession planning. In identifying potential candidates, boards should take into consideration the multiple dimensions of diversity, including personal factors such as gender, ethnicity, and age; as well as professional characteristics, such as a director’s industry, area of expertise, and geographic location. The board should review these dimensions of the current directors and how they might be augmented by incoming directors. We believe that directors are in the best position to assess the optimal size for the board, but we would be concerned if a board seemed too small to have an appropriate balance of directors or too large to be effective.

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There are matters for which the board has responsibility that may involve a conflict of interest for executives or for affiliated directors. BlackRock believes that shareholders’ interests are best served when the board forms committees of fully independent directors to deal with such matters. In many markets, these committees of the board specialize in audit, director nominations and compensation matters. An ad hoc committee might also be formed to decide on a special transaction, particularly one with a related party or to investigate a significant adverse event.

Auditors and audit-related issues

Comprehensive disclosure provides investors with a sense of the company’s long-term operational risk management practices and, more broadly, the quality of the board’s oversight. In the absence of robust disclosures, we may reasonably conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk.

BlackRock recognizes the critical importance of financial statements, which should provide a true and fair picture of a company’s financial condition. We will hold the members of the audit committee or equivalent responsible for overseeing the management of the audit function. We take particular note of cases involving significant financial restatements or ad hoc notifications of material financial weakness.

The integrity of financial statements depends on the auditor being free of any impediments to being an effective check on management. To that end, we believe it is important that auditors are, and are seen to be, independent. Where the audit firm provides services to the company in addition to the audit, the fees earned should be disclosed and explained. Audit committees should have in place a procedure for assessing annually the independence of the auditor.

Capital structure, mergers, asset sales and other special transactions

The capital structure of a company is critical to its owners, the shareholders, as it impacts the value of their investment and the priority of their interest in the company relative to that of other equity or debt investors. Pre-emptive rights are a key protection for shareholders against the dilution of their interests.

Effective voting rights are central to the rights of ownership and we believe strongly in one vote for one share as a guiding principle that supports good corporate governance. Shareholders, as the residual claimants, have the strongest interest in protecting company value, and voting power should match economic exposure.

We are concerned that the creation of a dual share class may result in an over-concentration of power in the hands of a few shareholders, thus disenfranchising other shareholders and amplifying the potential conflict of interest, which the one share, one vote principle is designed to mitigate. However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, companies may have a valid argument for dual-class listings, at least for a limited period of time. We believe that such companies should review these dual-class structures on a regular basis or as company circumstances change. Additionally, they should receive shareholder approval of their capital structure on a periodic basis via a management proposal in the company’s proxy. The proposal should give unaffiliated shareholders the opportunity to affirm the current structure or establish mechanisms to end or phase out controlling structures at the appropriate time, while minimizing costs to shareholders.

In assessing mergers, asset sales or other special transactions, BlackRock’s primary consideration is the long-term economic interests of shareholders. Boards proposing a transaction need to clearly explain the economic and strategic rationale behind it. We will review a proposed transaction to determine the degree to which it enhances long-term shareholder value. We would prefer that proposed transactions have the unanimous support of the board and have been negotiated at arm’s length. We may seek reassurance from the board that executives’ and/or board members’ financial interests in a given transaction have not adversely affected their ability to place shareholders’ interests before their own. Where the transaction involves related parties, we would expect the recommendation to support it to come from the independent directors and it is good practice to be approved by a separate vote of the non-conflicted shareholders.

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BlackRock believes that shareholders have a right to dispose of company shares in the open market without unnecessary restriction. In our view, corporate mechanisms designed to limit shareholders’ ability to sell their shares are contrary to basic property rights. Such mechanisms can serve to protect and entrench interests other than those of the shareholders. We believe that shareholders are broadly capable of making decisions in their own best interests. We expect any so-called ‘shareholder rights plans’ proposed by a board to be subject to shareholder approval upon introduction and periodically thereafter for continuation.

Compensation and benefits

BlackRock expects a company’s board of directors to put in place a compensation structure that incentivizes and rewards executives appropriately and is aligned with shareholder interests, particularly generating sustainable long-term shareholder returns. We would expect the compensation committee to take into account the specific circumstances of the company and the key individuals the board is trying to incentivize. We encourage companies to ensure that their compensation plans incorporate appropriate and challenging performance conditions consistent with corporate strategy and market practice. We use third party research, in addition to our own analysis, to evaluate existing and proposed compensation structures. We hold members of the compensation committee or equivalent board members accountable for poor compensation practices or structures.

BlackRock believes that there should be a clear link between variable pay and company performance that drives shareholder returns. We are not supportive of one-off or special bonuses unrelated to company or individual performance. We acknowledge that the use of peer group evaluation by compensation committees can help ensure competitive pay; however, we are concerned when increases in total compensation at a company are justified solely on peer benchmarking rather than outperformance. We support incentive plans that foster the sustainable achievement of results relative to competitors. The vesting timeframes associated with incentive plans should facilitate a focus on long-term value creation. We believe consideration should be given to building claw back provisions into incentive plans such that executives would be required to forgo rewards when they are not justified by actual performance. Compensation committees should guard against contractual arrangements that would entitle executives to material compensation for early termination of their contract. Finally, pension contributions and other deferred compensation arrangements should be reasonable in light of market practice.

Non-executive directors should be compensated in a manner that is commensurate with the time and effort expended in fulfilling their professional responsibilities. Additionally, these compensation arrangements should not risk compromising their independence or aligning their interests too closely with those of the management, whom they are charged with overseeing.

Environmental and social issues

Our fiduciary duty to clients is to protect and enhance their economic interest in the companies in which we invest on their behalf. It is within this context that we undertake our corporate governance activities. We believe that well-managed companies will deal effectively with the material environmental and social (“E&S”) factors relevant to their businesses. Robust disclosure is essential for investors to effectively gauge companies’ business practices and planning related to E&S risks and opportunities.

BlackRock expects companies to issue reports aligned with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and the standards put forward by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). We view the SASB and TCFD frameworks as complementary in achieving the goal of disclosing more financially material information, particularly as it relates to industry-specific metrics and target setting. TCFD’s recommendations provide an overarching framework for disclosure on the business implications of climate change, and potentially other E&S factors. We find SASB’s industry-specific guidance (as identified in its materiality map) beneficial in helping companies identify and discuss their governance, risk assessments, and performance against these key performance indicators (KPIs). Any global standards adopted, peer group benchmarking undertaken, and verification processes in place should also be disclosed and discussed in this context.

BlackRock has been engaging with companies for several years on disclosure of material E&S factors. Given the increased understanding of sustainability risks and opportunities, and the need for better information to assess them, we specifically ask companies to:

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| 1) | publish a disclosure in line with industry-specific SASB guidelines by year-end, if they have not already done so, or disclose a similar set of data in a way that is relevant to their particular business; and

| 2) | disclose climate-related risks in line with the TCFD’s recommendations, if they have not already done so. This should include the company’s plan for operating under a scenario where the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to less than two degrees is fully realized, as expressed by the TCFD guidelines.

See our commentary on our approach to engagement on TCFD and SASB aligned reporting for greater detail of our expectations.

We will use these disclosures and our engagements to ascertain whether companies are properly managing and overseeing these risks within their business and adequately planning for the future. In the absence of robust disclosures, investors, including BlackRock, will increasingly conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk.

We believe that when a company is not effectively addressing a material issue, its directors should be held accountable. We will generally engage directly with the board or management of a company when we identify issues. We may vote against the election of directors where we have concerns that a company might not be dealing with E&S factors appropriately. Sometimes we may reflect such concerns by supporting a shareholder proposal on the issue, where there seems to be either a significant potential threat or realized harm to shareholders’ interests caused by poor management of material E&S factors.

In deciding our course of action, we will assess the company’s disclosures and the nature of our engagement with the company on the issue over time, including whether:

● | The company has already taken sufficient steps to address the concern

● | The company is in the process of actively implementing a response

● | There is a clear and material economic disadvantage to the company in the near-term if the issue is not addressed in the manner requested by the shareholder proposal

We do not see it as our role to make social or political judgments on behalf of clients. Our consideration of these E&S factors is consistent with protecting the long-term economic interest of our clients’ assets. We expect investee companies to comply, at a minimum, with the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions in which they operate. They should explain how they manage situations where local laws or regulations that significantly impact the company’s operations are contradictory or ambiguous to global norms.

Climate risk

Within the framework laid out above, as well as our guidance on “How BlackRock Investment Stewardship engages on climate risk,” we believe that climate presents significant investment risks and opportunities that may impact the long-term financial sustainability of companies. We believe that the reporting frameworks developed by TCFD and SASB provide useful guidance to companies on identifying, managing, and reporting on climate-related risks and opportunities.

We expect companies to help their investors understand how the company may be impacted by climate risk, in the context of its ability to realize a long-term strategy and generate value over time. We expect companies to convey their governance around this issue through their corporate disclosures aligned with TCFD and SASB. For companies in sectors that are significantly exposed to climate-related risk, we expect the whole board to have demonstrable fluency in how climate risk affects the business and how management approaches assessing, adapting to, and mitigating that risk.

Where a company receives a shareholder proposal related to climate risk, in addition to the factors laid out above, our assessment will take into account the robustness of the company’s existing disclosures as well as our understanding of its management of the issues as revealed through our engagements with the company and board members over time. In certain instances, we may disagree with the details of a climate-related shareholder proposal but agree that the company in question has not made sufficient progress on climate-related disclosures. In these instances, we may not support the proposal, but may vote against the election of relevant directors.

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General corporate governance matters and shareholder protections

BlackRock believes that shareholders have a right to timely and detailed information on the financial performance and viability of the companies in which they invest. In addition, companies should also publish information on the governance structures in place and the rights of shareholders to influence these. The reporting and disclosure provided by companies help shareholders assess whether their economic interests have been protected and the quality of the board’s oversight of management. We believe shareholders should have the right to vote on key corporate governance matters, including changes to governance mechanisms, to submit proposals to the shareholders’ meeting and to call special meetings of shareholders.

BlackRock’s oversight of its investment

stewardship activities

Oversight

We hold ourselves to a very high standard in our investment stewardship activities, including proxy voting. This function is executed by a team called BlackRock Investment Stewardship (“BIS”) which is comprised of BlackRock employees who do not have other responsibilities other than their roles in BIS. BIS is considered an investment function. The team does not have sales responsibilities.

BlackRock maintains three regional advisory committees (“Stewardship Advisory Committees”) for (a) the Americas; (b) Europe, the Middle East and Africa (“EMEA”); and (c) Asia-Pacific, generally consisting of senior BlackRock investment professionals and/or senior employees with practical boardroom experience. The regional Stewardship Advisory Committees review and advise on amendments to the proxy voting guidelines covering markets within each respective region (“Guidelines”).

In addition to the regional Stewardship Advisory Committees, the Investment Stewardship Global Oversight Committee (“Global Committee”) is a risk-focused committee, comprised of senior representatives from various BlackRock investment teams, BlackRock’s Deputy General Counsel, the Global Head of Investment Stewardship (“Global Head”), and other senior executives with relevant experience and team oversight.

The Global Head has primary oversight of the activities of BIS, including voting in accordance with the Guidelines, which require the application of professional judgment and consideration of each company’s unique circumstances. The Global Committee reviews and approves amendments to these Global Corporate Governance & Engagement Principles. The Global Committee also reviews and approves amendments to the regional Guidelines, as proposed by the regional Stewardship Advisory Committees.

In addition, the Global Committee receives and reviews periodic reports regarding the votes cast by BIS, as well as regular updates on material process issues, procedural changes and other risk oversight considerations. The Global Committee reviews these reports in an oversight capacity as informed by the BIS corporate governance engagement program and Guidelines.

BIS carries out engagement with companies, monitors and executes proxy votes, and conducts vote operations (including maintaining records of votes cast) in a manner consistent with the relevant Guidelines. BIS also conducts research on corporate governance issues and participates in industry discussions to keep abreast of important developments in the corporate governance field. BIS may utilize third parties for certain of the foregoing activities and performs oversight of those third parties. BIS may raise complicated or particularly controversial matters for internal discussion with the relevant investment teams and/or refer such matters to the appropriate regional Stewardship Advisory Committees for review, discussion and guidance prior to making a voting decision.

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Vote execution

We carefully consider proxies submitted to funds and other fiduciary account(s) (“Fund” or “Funds”) for which we have voting authority. BlackRock votes (or refrains from voting) proxies for each Fund for which we have voting authority based on our evaluation of the best long-term economic interests of shareholders, in the exercise of our independent business judgment, and without regard to the relationship of the issuer of the proxy (or any shareholder proponent or dissident shareholder) to the Fund, the Fund’s affiliates (if any), BlackRock or BlackRock’s affiliates, or BlackRock employees (see “Conflicts management policies and procedures”, below).

When exercising voting rights, BlackRock will normally vote on specific proxy issues in accordance with the Guidelines for the relevant market. The Guidelines are reviewed regularly and are amended consistent with changes in the local market practice, as developments in corporate governance occur, or as otherwise deemed advisable by BlackRock’s Stewardship Advisory Committees. BIS may, in the exercise of their professional judgment, conclude that the Guidelines do not cover the specific matter upon which a proxy vote is required or that an exception to the Guidelines would be in the best long-term economic interests of BlackRock’s clients.

In the uncommon circumstance of there being a vote with respect to fixed income securities or the securities of privately held issuers, the decision generally will be made by a Fund’s portfolio managers and/or BIS based on their assessment of the particular transactions or other matters at issue.

In certain markets, proxy voting involves logistical issues which can affect BlackRock’s ability to vote such proxies, as well as the desirability of voting such proxies. These issues include but are not limited to: (i) untimely notice of shareholder meetings; (ii) restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to exercise votes; (iii) requirements to vote proxies in person; (iv) “share-blocking” (requirements that investors who exercise their voting rights surrender the right to dispose of their holdings for some specified period in proximity to the shareholder meeting); (v) potential difficulties in translating the proxy; (vi) regulatory constraints; and (vii) requirements to provide local agents with unrestricted powers of attorney to facilitate voting instructions. We are not supportive of impediments to the exercise of voting rights such as shareblocking or overly burdensome administrative requirements.

As a consequence, BlackRock votes proxies on a “best-efforts” basis. In addition, BIS may determine that it is generally in the best interests of BlackRock’s clients not to vote proxies if the costs (including but not limited to opportunity costs associated with shareblocking constraints) associated with exercising a vote are expected to outweigh the benefit the client would derive by voting on the proposal.

Portfolio managers have full discretion to vote the shares in the Funds they manage based on their analysis of the economic impact of a particular ballot item. Portfolio managers may from time to time reach differing views on how best to maximize economic value with respect to a particular investment. Therefore, portfolio managers may, and sometimes do, vote shares in the Funds under their management differently from one another. However, because BlackRock’s clients are mostly long-term investors with long-term economic goals, ballots are frequently cast in a uniform manner.

Conflicts management policies and procedures

BIS maintains the following policies and procedures that seek to prevent undue influence on BlackRock’s proxy voting activity. Such influence might stem from any relationship between the investee company (or any shareholder proponent or dissident shareholder) and BlackRock, BlackRock’s affiliates, a Fund or a Fund’s affiliates, or BlackRock employees. The following are examples of sources of perceived or potential conflicts of interest:

● | BlackRock clients who may be issuers of securities or proponents of shareholder resolutions

● | BlackRock business partners or third parties who may be issuers of securities or proponents of shareholder resolutions

● | BlackRock employees who may sit on the boards of public companies held in Funds managed by BlackRock

● | Significant BlackRock, Inc. investors who may be issuers of securities held in Funds managed by BlackRock

● | Securities of BlackRock, Inc. or BlackRock investment funds held in Funds managed by BlackRock

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● | BlackRock, Inc. board members who serve as senior executives of public companies held in Funds managed by BlackRock

BlackRock has taken certain steps to mitigate perceived or potential conflicts including, but not limited to, the following:

● | Adopted the Guidelines which are designed to protect and enhance the economic value of the companies in which BlackRock invests on behalf of clients.

● | Established a reporting structure that separates BIS from employees with sales, vendor management or business partnership roles. In addition, BlackRock seeks to ensure that all engagements with corporate issuers, dissident shareholders or shareholder proponents are managed consistently and without regard to BlackRock’s relationship with such parties. Clients or business partners are not given special treatment or differentiated access to BIS. BIS prioritizes engagements based on factors including but not limited to our need for additional information to make a voting decision or our view on the likelihood that an engagement could lead to positive outcome(s) over time for the economic value of the company. Within the normal course of business, BIS may engage directly with BlackRock clients, business partners and/or third parties, and/or with employees with sales, vendor management or business partnership roles, in discussions regarding our approach to stewardship, general corporate governance matters, client reporting needs, and/or to otherwise ensure that proxy-related client service levels are met.

● | Determined to engage, in certain instances, an independent fiduciary to vote proxies as a further safeguard to avoid potential conflicts of interest, to satisfy regulatory compliance requirements, or as may be otherwise required by applicable law. In such circumstances, the independent fiduciary provides BlackRock’s proxy voting agent with instructions, in accordance with the Guidelines, as to how to vote such proxies, and BlackRock’s proxy voting agent votes the proxy in accordance with the independent fiduciary’s determination. BlackRock uses an independent fiduciary to vote proxies of (i) any company that is affiliated with BlackRock, Inc., (ii) any public company that includes BlackRock employees on its board of directors, (iii) The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., (iv) any public company of which a BlackRock, Inc. board member serves as a senior executive, and (v) companies when legal or regulatory requirements compel BlackRock to use an independent fiduciary. In selecting an independent fiduciary, we assess several characteristics, including but not limited to: independence, an ability to analyze proxy issues and vote in the best economic interest of our clients, reputation for reliability and integrity, and operational capacity to accurately deliver the assigned votes in a timely manner. We may engage more than one independent fiduciary, in part in order to mitigate potential or perceived conflicts of interest at an independent fiduciary. The Global Committee appoints and reviews the performance of the independent fiduciar(ies), generally on an annual basis.

When so authorized, BlackRock acts as a securities lending agent on behalf of Funds. With regard to the relationship between securities lending and proxy voting, BlackRock’s approach is driven by our clients’ economic interests. The decision whether to recall securities on loan to vote is based on a formal analysis of the revenue producing value to clients of loans, against the assessed economic value of casting votes. Generally, we expect that the likely economic value to clients of casting votes would be less than the securities lending income, either because, in our assessment, the resolutions being voted on will not have significant economic consequences or because the outcome would not be affected by BlackRock recalling loaned securities in order to vote. BlackRock also may, in our discretion, determine that the value of voting outweighs the cost of recalling shares, and thus recall shares to vote in that instance.

Periodically, BlackRock reviews our process for determining whether to recall securities on loan in order to vote and may modify it as necessary.

Voting guidelines

The issue-specific Guidelines published for each region/country in which we vote are intended to summarize BlackRock’s general philosophy and approach to issues that may commonly arise in the proxy voting context in each market where we invest. These Guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. BIS applies the Guidelines on a case-by-case basis, in the context of the individual circumstances of each company and the specific issue under review. As such, these Guidelines do not indicate how BIS will vote in every instance. Rather, they share our view about corporate governance issues generally, and provide insight into how we typically approach issues that commonly arise on corporate ballots.

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Reporting and vote transparency

We inform clients about our engagement and voting policies and activities through direct communication and through disclosure on our website. Each year we publish an annual report, an annual engagement and voting statistics report, and our full voting record to our website. On a quarterly basis, we publish regional reports which provide an overview of our investment stewardship engagement and voting activities during the quarter, including market developments, speaking engagements, and engagement and voting statistics. Additionally, we make public our market-specific voting guidelines for the benefit of clients and companies with whom we engage.

This document is provided for information purposes only and must not be relied upon as a forecast, research, or investment advice. BlackRock is not making any recommendation or soliciting any action based upon the information contained herein and nothing in this document should be construed as constituting an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, securities in any jurisdiction to any person. This information provided herein does not constitute financial, tax, legal or accounting advice, you should consult your own advisers on such matters.

The information and opinions contained in this document are as of January 2020 unless it is stated otherwise and may change as subsequent conditions vary. The information and opinions contained in this material are derived from proprietary and non-proprietary sources deemed by BlackRock to be reliable, are not necessarily all-inclusive and are not guaranteed as to accuracy. Although such information is believed to be reliable for the purposes used herein, BlackRock does not assume any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Reliance upon information in this material is at the sole discretion of the reader. Certain information contained herein represents or is based upon forward-looking statements or information. BlackRock and its affiliates believe that such statements and information are based upon reasonable estimates and assumptions. However, forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain, and factors may cause events or results to differ from those projected. Therefore, undue reliance should not be placed on such forward-looking statements and information.

Prepared by BlackRock, Inc.

©2020 BlackRock, Inc. All rights reserved.

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