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<TYPE>EX-99.A
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<FILENAME>c32296_ex99a.txt
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                                                                       EXHIBIT A

PROPOSAL:

That the investment management agreement, between the Fund and Deutsche
Investment Management Americas Inc., as currently in effect on the date hereof,
be terminated immediately.

STATEMENT:

President and Fellows of Harvard College ("Harvard") has been a shareholder of
the Fund for more than 4 years. We currently own almost 10 million shares, more
than 22.2% of the Fund. We have communicated with Deutsche Investment Management
Americas, Inc. ("DIM"), the Fund's manager, several times regarding the discount
of the Fund's shares from their net asset value. Last December, we met with the
Fund's Board and representatives of DIM. We discussed the discount and ways in
which the Fund might reduce or eliminate the discount. We believe that a large
discount is unacceptable, and that the Board has several viable alternatives to
reduce or eliminate the discount.

Instead of implementing one of these viable alternatives, early this year the
Fund announced a tender offer for up to 10% of its shares at 95% of its then
current net asset value, with a program for up to two additional similar tender
offers in the following years if the discount exceeded 15%. This program is
totally inadequate and brings to light the severe conflicts that exist between
Fund shareholders and DIM.

Had DIM formulated a substantial tender offer for up to 50% or more of the
Fund's shares and made the offering price net asset value rather than a discount
from net asset value, DIM truly would have created value for shareholders. That
tender offer, however, also would have resulted in a loss in fees for DIM since
its fees are based on the size of the Fund. Clearly, DIM chose preservation of
its interests over the interests of shareholders. DIM could not have followed
this path without the approval of the Fund's Board. We have tried to assess why
the Board has gone along with DIM.

It cannot be DIM's extraordinary performance. The Fund's performance is ordinary
when compared to competitors and to recognized indices for the Korean securities
in which it invests. While rules of the Korean securities markets under which
the Fund operates limit its ability to liquidate holdings, DIM has not made any
effort to obtain relief from those rules. The Korean securities market has
matured exponentially since the inception of the Fund. Harvard believes the Fund
readily could have obtained relief from those rules. Others have. Even with the
rules, DIM and the Board could have done much better than the program they
announced.

Our conclusion is that DIM has undue influence over the Board and that Harvard
and other shareholders will not get management responsive to our interests
unless DIM is removed as the Fund's manager. Accordingly, Harvard has submitted
a proposal to terminate DIM's investment management agreement with the Fund,
effective immediately. Upon the termination of the management agreement, DIM's
research and advisory agreement with its subadvisor, Deutsche Investments Trust
Management Company Limited, shall automatically terminate in accordance with its
terms.

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