
Hard-landing? Soft-landing? No landing? Peak interest rates?
These questions have dominated market discourse during the
financial year. The obvious truth is that neither we nor anyone
else can be certain if, when, or how deep any contraction
might be. Moreover, whilst we have started to see some
cracks in the hitherto resilient US consumer demand –
causing weakness in share prices spanning clothing, luxury
goods, spirits and other discretionary goods – economic
activity has generally surprised positively. Accordingly, the
market has had to regularly recalibrate its view of the likely
duration of high inflation levels and correspondingly elevated
interest rates (‘elevated’, that is, relative to only recent history).
Much of the market commentary still calls for a hard-landing,
followed by an inevitable central bank capitulation to lower
rates. This cannot be eliminated as a risk, especially if the
speed of rate hikes causes an accident somehow, somewhere
in the financial system (the UK Gilt tantrum of late 2022 and
the mini-banking crisis of early 2023 serve as cautionary
reminders that something can lurk out of sight). But it is
always worth considering the motive of those making such
aforecast; many participants wish for a hard-landing, having
made a lucrative career out of zero interest rates (think
fixed-income managers, or equity investors with growth,
technology or ESG mandates). They would understandably
wish for those good times to return. If it must come via a
painful economic contraction, then so be it.
It is also worth taking a step back from the never-ending cycle
of macro-monetary noise emanating from media outlets such
as Bloomberg, which are of course incentivised to make you
as insecure, as reactive and as trigger happy as possible in
financial markets; you need live pricing, you need access to
research and datasets and you need live analysis of the latest
earth-shattering event, be it a CPI print, a non-farm payrolls
figure or the latest utterance of ‘Fedspeak’ by a central bank
official at a random conference. This is the edge you need to
make money. No serious investor could possibly operate
without it – or so they would have you think.
A new capex supercycle –
de-globalisation and artificial
intelligencewill define geopolitics
There is a lot to constantly distract an investor from more
meaningful developments. When we as a team debate the
outlook for inflation and the corresponding cost of capital,
wetry to take a longer-term view of changes across society
and their potential impact on economic activity. In this
respect, political discourse – and increasingly policy action
– suggests something different and powerful is going on
underneath the near-term focused chatter. Yes, central banks
are raising rates and reversing that great ‘innovation’ of the
financial crisis – quantitative easing (“QE”) – in order to rein in
inflation by cooling economic activity. But many governments,
not least that of the United States, are making their job much
harder. Economic hardship does not go down well with
voters. De-globalisation and pro-labour populism are strong
mandates for those who command the national coffers.
TheUS is running an historically high budget deficit of 7%,
asvarious stimulus packages – collectively known as
‘Bidenomics’ – splurge over $1 trillion on highways, rail and
other infrastructure, while providing generous incentives for
corporates to deploy their capital into the ‘onshoring’ of
critical supply chains in everything from semiconductors to
electric vehicles and energy security. This is more than the
USgovernment mobilised in response to the Global Financial
Crisis. Not even the profligate Europeans are engaging in such
fiscal largesse; France and Italy are ‘only’ running budget
deficits of around 5%. The OECD is averaging over 4%. We
have never seen the likes of this government activity during
peacetime (although it may be optimistic to describe the
current geopolitical backdrop as such).
These trends don’t appear to be fads, just as zero-interest
ratepolicy (“ZIRP”) and QE were not short-lived phenomena.
There are currently 35,000 trade protectionist measures in
place globally, up from only 9,000 a decade ago, according
toGlobal Trade Alert. Supply chains must adjust to new
constraints, often through capital redeployment. Many of our
investee companies are either seeing evidence of this in their
order books and/or utilising their own strong balance sheets
to invest. Construction spend on manufacturing facilities in the
US has already reached almost 0.6% of GDP, a level not seen
since before the World Trade Organisation was established
inthe early 1990s. Furthermore, a record 67% of Americans
have a favourable view of trade unions, suggesting that
‘America First’ is a policy objective likely to be pursued,
regardless of who secures the White House in 2024. In turn,
other major economic blocs such as Europe feel obliged to
follow with their own measures. One of the strands of our
investment ‘DNA’ (for which we have introduced a dedicated
section this year) is ‘Believe in Cycles’. We believe that we are
at an inflection point in the long-cycle politics of globalisation,
with corresponding long-duration implications for capital
expenditure, wages, inflation and interest rates. Capital
investment cycles tend to be long term in nature, for the
simple reason that building stuff takes time. This affords many
of our exposed investee companies a good degree of visibility
under all but the most extreme scenarios for near-term
economic momentum. Hard-landing or not, there will probably
be ‘shovels going into the ground’.
Aside from industrial policy objectives, it is worth considering
the strength of private sector capital deployment, as it
highlights a key segment of the opportunities we are pursuing
in European equities. It is well known that Europe does not
possess the ‘Big Tech’ superstars. But, importantly, it does
possess many of the enablers, or ‘picks and shovels’, that
willbe necessary as this exclusive club embarks on an
unprecedented period of capital intensity. In 2019 the
combined capital expenditure of Microsoft, Google, Meta
(formerly Facebook), Amazon and Apple was around $70bn.
In 2024 it will reach around $190bn, up by $35bn on 2023.
The magnitude of this should not be understated; it equates
Fund Managers’ Report
Henderson European Focus Trust plc Annual Report 2023
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