
5
Background and context
Before discussing the returns during 2023, and
the outlook for 2024, it is worth recapping on the
experience of 2022, and how we felt as 2022 unfolded.
The main message in 2022 was the level of overvaluation
that we believed was apparent across all asset classes
and markets, flowing from the extended period of
interest rate suppression. Whilst inflation was thought
to be absent from the system it was possible for markets
to believe in a world where excessive debt carried little
consequences, leverage was positive and economic
growth could continue without any setback, safe in the
knowledge that governments would step in whenever
necessary. This sanguine market view was interrupted
when post-Covid consumption increases and the
invasion of Ukraine met supply side bottlenecks, oil
prices soared and inflation reared its head. The net result
was that asset markets declined markedly during 2022,
although this was mitigated for sterling-based investors
by the pound’s depreciation.
Prior to these price moves it was possible to make
an unequivocal statement about the excess valuation
in asset markets, requiring as it did a heroic set of
assumptions to provide any meaningful justification.
Once those price moves had taken place, the position
was more nuanced. Many sovereign bonds for example,
including UK Gilts and US Treasuries, had moved to
yields which in the event of declines in inflation would
leave them, for the first time in several years, trading in a
historically sustainable range. Whether they represented
good value or not at those levels would be determined
by one’s economic outlook, but they could plausibly be
seen as at least fair value. Equities in the major markets
on the other hand remained, despite the declines, at
historically high valuations.
Cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratios (Shiller) US
equities, even at the trough in February 2022, were at a
valuation similar to that which existed before the 1929
crash and only exceeded two other times in a hundred
years. To justify such a valuation required a view that the
global economy was at an economic trough and about to
venture into an extended period of strong growth. This
was not our view. We believed that the normalisation of
interest rates would slow growth from the post Covid
sugar high and that economic conditions would tighten.
Our concerns lay with future growth, not inflation. As
the year progressed markets took the view that falling
inflation would lead to interest rate declines and that
the equity party could recommence. As a consequence,
there were meaningful rallies in equity markets
globally. In our view this was effectively a nostalgic
desire to go back to a period where interest rates were
suppressed and governments used fiscal policy to try and
maintain growth.
We do not subscribe to the view that the post ‘Global
Financial Crisis’ world can be recreated. Whilst the US
recorded 2.5% real growth in 2023 this was supported
by a significant fiscal injection and despite the backdrop
of a debt/GDP position in excess of 100%. The fiscal
arithmetic is such that limits on the extent to which
governments can sustain growth are now very real.
Indeed, history suggests that fiscal retrenchment will be
required at some point soon. In other words, if market
rises were predicated on expectations of more of the
same, they are likely to be disappointed.
It is hard to see how the global economy can survive the
accumulated debt levels and normalisation of interest
rates without economic pain. A repeat can only come
about if debt markets become particularly supine.
Despite the fiscal injection, there is evidence of rising
corporate bankruptcy filings (from public companies or
private companies with listed debt) such that in the US,
for example, the level reached in 2023 was the highest
since 2010
1
. Moreover, studies suggest the proportion
of listed companies that can be described as “zombies”,
meaning able to generate sufficient cash, to survive, but
unable to grow or make a meaningful profit, has almost
doubled to over 10%
2
. For context, 10% would be a
level exceeded only once since 2000.
Rather than a rosy economic environment ahead, the
storm clouds look to be gathering. Sovereign bond prices
may not suffer too much from here, but one has to expect
credit spreads to widen and for equities eventually to react
to an environment in which profit progression becomes
increasingly difficult. Policymakers should be aware also
of the tail risk of sovereign credit risk becoming a theme
the vulture funds can latch onto. The deterioration in
Germany’s economic position is particularly worthy of note.
The portfolio
Since our view on future economic prospects and
current valuations in equities has not changed
significantly, the portfolio structure remains similar to
last year. In last year’s Annual Report we highlighted the
characteristics of the portfolio. Specifically, we set out
the four major components and the role that they play
in creating a structure which aims to reduce the absolute
downside whilst retaining some upside potential.
1. The direct equity portfolio at the end of 2023
accounted for approximately 40% of the total assets.
It had a total return of 9.5%, just over half of that
recorded by the MSCI All Country World Index. This is in
line with our expectations given the defensive nature of
the portfolio. Fresenius Medical Care rose by over 30%
as it recovered from previous concerns over US staffing
shortages. We felt that with the rise in direct obesity
medicines the market for diabetes care would eventually
be affected and hence we sold the holding. The rest of
the portfolio remained relatively stable with few new
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR’S REPORT
1
S&P Global Market Intelligence
2
The Rise of the Walking Dead: Zombie Firms Around the World; Albuquerque, B and Iyer, R. I IMF WP/23/125, June 2023