

Addendum to 2018 Notice of annual general meeting Resolutions requisitioned by members

This addendum forms part of the Rio Tinto Limited 2018 Notice of annual general meeting

Letter from the chairman

Dear shareholder,

This is an addendum to the Rio Tinto Limited 2018 Notice of annual general meeting dated 28 February 2018.

The law in Australia allows shareholders to give a notice to a company requiring resolutions to be voted on at a general meeting. Rio Tinto Limited has been served with a notice from shareholders representing approximately 0.24 per cent of the shares on issue in Rio Tinto Limited proposing two resolutions for the 2018 annual general meeting. These resolutions seek:

- an amendment to the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited; and
- a board-commissioned review of Rio Tinto's direct and indirect public policy advocacy on energy and climate change, publication of a report on that review, and the disclosure of criteria by reference to which the company would discontinue membership of an industry association.

The requisitioned resolutions and explanatory notes, together with statements provided by the requisitioning members for circulation to shareholders, are set out in this addendum. The accompanying proxy form for the annual general meeting includes the two additional resolutions.

There is no change to the date, time or place of the Rio Tinto Limited annual general meeting. It will be held at **9.30am on Wednesday, 2 May 2018 at the Grand Ballroom, Sofitel Melbourne On Collins, 25 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria.**


If you are unable to attend the meeting to vote in person, please complete and submit your proxy form in line with the instructions on page 5 of the original notice of meeting.

As set out in the original notice of meeting, your directors are unanimously of the opinion that resolutions 1 to 18 set out in that notice are in the best interests of shareholders and of Rio Tinto as a whole, and accordingly recommend that you **vote in favour of resolutions 1 to 18.**

Resolutions 19 and 20 set out in this addendum are not endorsed by your directors. Your directors consider that resolutions 19 and 20 are not in the best interests of shareholders or of Rio Tinto as a whole, and **recommend that you vote against resolutions 19 and 20.**

Resolutions 19 and 20 will be put to shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited only. No equivalent resolutions have been requisitioned by shareholders in Rio Tinto plc.

Yours sincerely



Simon Thompson

Chairman

14 March 2018

Additional resolutions

The resolutions in this addendum have been requisitioned under section 249N of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 by shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited. The requisition has been put forward by the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility and a group of shareholders representing approximately 0.24 per cent of the shares on issue in Rio Tinto Limited. These requisitioning shareholders include co-filers Local Government Super, the Church of England Pensions Board and The Seventh Swedish National Pension Fund.

The numbering of these resolutions is a continuation of the numbering used in the Rio Tinto Limited 2018 Notice of annual general meeting dated 28 February 2018.

Resolution 19 will be proposed as a special resolution. Resolution 20 will be proposed as an ordinary resolution. However, resolution 20 will be a valid resolution only if resolution 19 is approved by the required majority - that is, the validity of resolution 20 is conditional on resolution 19 being passed.

Your directors recommend that you vote against resolutions 19 and 20.

Resolution 19

Special resolution to amend our company's constitution

To insert into our company's constitution the following new clause 60A:

"Member resolutions at general meeting

The shareholders in general meeting may by ordinary resolution express an opinion, ask for information, or make a request, about the way in which a power of the company partially or exclusively vested in the directors has been or should be exercised. However, such a resolution must relate to an issue of material relevance to the company or the company's business as identified by the company, and cannot either advocate action which would violate any law or relate to any personal claim or grievance. Such a resolution is advisory only and does not bind the directors or the company."

The board recommends that shareholders **vote against resolution 19** for the reasons set out in the explanatory notes.

The chairman of the meeting intends to vote undirected proxies **against** resolution 19.

Resolution 20

Ordinary resolution on public policy advocacy on climate change and energy by Relevant Industry Associations

Shareholders request that:

- (1) the Board commission a comprehensive review of our company's positions, oversight and processes related to direct and indirect public policy advocacy (**Review**), including through industry associations of which our company is a member or at which our company is formally represented (**Relevant Industry Associations**), on energy and climate change, covering the period 2012 to the present day.

We request that this Review:

- a. describe *all payments* by our company to Relevant Industry Associations engaged in direct or indirect public policy advocacy relating to climate and energy policy, in each case including the amount of the payment, the date of the payment and the recipient;

- b. evaluate whether advocacy positions* taken by Relevant Industry Associations, *in respect of Australian climate and energy policy* serve our company's policy and financial interests; and
- c. evaluate whether advocacy positions* taken by Relevant Industry Associations are consistent with our company's pledge of support for *the Paris Agreement as a global framework for reducing emissions*.

*Given that 'advocacy positions' by Relevant Industry Associations are not always taken in written form, we request that this Review include, as evidence of such advocacy positions, credible media reporting.

- (2) the Board prepare (at reasonable cost and omitting confidential information) a report describing the completed Review and detailing the proposed actions to be taken as a result of the Review, to be made available to shareholders on the company website within four months of the AGM at which this proposal is discussed.
- (3) the Board determine, and disclose to shareholders, the criteria by reference to which the company would discontinue membership of a Relevant Industry Association, in circumstances where the company's interests in respect of energy and climate policy are not promoted by that Association.

The board recommends that shareholders **vote against resolution 20** for the reasons set out in the explanatory notes.

The chairman of the meeting intends to vote undirected proxies **against** resolution 20.

By order of the board



Tim Paine
Joint company secretary



Steve Allen
Joint company secretary

Rio Tinto Limited
ABN 96 004 458 404

Registered office:
Level 7, 360 Collins Street
Melbourne, Victoria 3000

14 March 2018

Explanatory notes

Resolution 19

Special resolution requisitioned by members of Rio Tinto Limited to amend the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited

Resolution 19 seeks an amendment to the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited. (There is no proposal to amend the articles of association of Rio Tinto plc.)

Statement by the board

This resolution proposes to amend the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited to enable shareholders, by ordinary resolution, to express an opinion, ask for information or make a request about the way in which a power vested partially or exclusively in the directors has been or should be exercised. The proposed amendment expressly provides that any shareholder resolution made pursuant to the proposed constitutional amendment would be advisory only and would not bind the directors or Rio Tinto.

The board considers that the proposed constitutional amendment to allow non-binding advisory resolutions is likely to create uncertainty and gives rise to a number of practical difficulties, including in relation to the authority and accountability of the directors.

Under the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited, the board is vested with the power to manage and control the business and affairs of Rio Tinto. In fulfilling their duties, the directors are required to take into account a wide range of considerations. It is important that the directors be able to exercise this power as they see fit and be clearly accountable to shareholders for doing so.

Whilst Rio Tinto fully supports the principle of engagement with shareholders to ensure that their views are taken into account, the position under Australian law in relation to the status of non-binding advisory resolutions is unclear. The board believes that any introduction of a framework to permit non-binding advisory resolutions should be by legislative change in order to provide clarity of the consequences and implications of such resolutions for companies and their

directors. Any proposal for legislative change would be subject to full public consultation and debate and would take into account the views of all stakeholders. This approach would ensure that a framework is established for non-binding advisory resolutions that applies consistently to all companies and their directors. In the absence of such legislative change, the proposed constitutional amendment is likely to result in confusion for shareholders and wider stakeholders.

The proposed constitutional amendment allowing shareholders to "express an opinion" or "make a request" about how your directors should exercise their powers would undermine both the authority and accountability of the board, and, consequently, is not conducive towards effective administration and governance.

In addition, shareholders already have means to voice their views and opinions, including the right to ask questions or make comments at an annual general meeting. There is also regular and extensive engagement between Rio Tinto (at chairman, non-executive director and management level) and its institutional shareholders around the world.

Ultimately, shareholders contribute to the course and direction of Rio Tinto by voting on the composition of the board.

Recommendation

For the reasons set out above, the board has formed the view that the resolution is not in the interests of shareholders or of Rio Tinto as a whole and therefore recommends that shareholders **vote against resolution 19**.

The chairman of the meeting intends to vote undirected proxies **against** resolution 19.

Resolution 20

Resolution requisitioned by members of Rio Tinto Limited on public policy advocacy on climate change and energy

Resolution 20 is an advisory resolution. The validity of resolution 20 is conditional on resolution 19 being passed by the required majority.

Statement by the board

Rio Tinto has had a public position on climate change since 2005 which recognises the science of climate change, supports the goal to limit global temperature rise below 2°C, outlines the role of our company and our products in responding to that goal, and lays out our policy principles for climate advocacy.

Rio Tinto also understands that the advocacy positions we take on climate change and energy policy, and our involvement in industry associations, are important to our shareholders.

We are actively engaging with the co-filers of resolution 20 and other interested stakeholders as part of our ongoing commitment to understanding our shareholders' views on this issue. In light of our commitments made at the 2016 annual general meeting, we are supportive of parts of the proposed resolution and will continue to take steps consistent with our commitments. However, the resolution as a whole is not required to achieve these aims. The board is recommending that shareholders vote against this resolution 20 for the following reasons:

- At our annual general meeting in 2016, Rio Tinto supported a resolution on climate change known as the "Aiming for A" resolution. This included asking the company to increase its reporting on several climate related topics, including public policy positions relating to climate change. Rio Tinto has therefore already committed to ongoing reporting to improve transparency on climate matters generally and in relation to advocacy (see www.riotinto.com/AGM2016 to view documents relating to our 2016 AGM);
- Rio Tinto has a public position statement on climate change that we use to guide our public advocacy on climate change issues and that supports consistency across the jurisdictions in which we operate (to view our climate position see www.riotinto.com/OurCommitment);
- Rio Tinto reports on industry associations that we belong to in the Carbon Disclosure Project submission – an investor led disclosure initiative (www.cdp.net/en);
- Rio Tinto provides written submissions on climate change policy proposals globally, where appropriate, which provide clarity on our specific policy positions; and
- Rio Tinto continually assesses the alignment of its own policy positions with those of the industry associations with whom we engage, and has a process for determining appropriate measures when divergences of opinion arise.

Our company is on track to exceed its greenhouse gas emissions intensity target of 24 per cent reduction between 2008 and 2020 and we have reduced our total emissions since 2008 by 38 per cent. We continue to aim for a substantial decarbonisation of our business by 2050. Rio Tinto supports the intent of the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board's Taskforce for Climate-related Financial Disclosures that were released in June 2017 and we are evolving our reporting to align with these and with the Aiming for A recommendations (view our sustainable development report for 2017 at www.riotinto.com/OurCommitment). Our focus is on ensuring that the assessment of the impacts of climate change are clearly communicated internally and inform decision-making. We are also committed to improving transparency to help shareholders understand our positions on climate change and energy issues, and the internal processes we have in place to support this. This already includes disclosure on our membership of organisations and our public policy engagement.

Memberships of industry associations are an important part of stakeholder engagement. They provide an opportunity for Rio Tinto to better understand a diverse range of external views, share best practice, and contribute our perspectives and experiences in support of good policy outcomes. Our view is that significant progress towards a solution on the complex issue of climate change will only occur where there is broad engagement involving business, governments, investors, civil society organisations and consumers.

Each industry association is different. They represent a different mix of companies and organisations and often cover multiple issues, not just climate change and energy. Rio Tinto's activities across the different association agendas will also vary. The positions that industry associations take need to consider a range of members' views, and the nuance and emphasis of positions may differ from that of Rio Tinto. We believe that diverse and differing views should always be heard and are an important step in finding compromise that allows progress to be made. In this regard, we note the Energy & climate change policy statement published by the Minerals Council of Australia on 14 March 2018 (see www.minerals.org.au/policy_focus/energy_climate_change). Rio Tinto has been engaged in this policy process and further notes that the statement affirms positions on key aspects of energy and climate change policy that Rio Tinto considers important.

While we therefore do not support the resolution, Rio Tinto commits to:

- continue to engage with shareholders, investors and civil society on climate change disclosure expectations;
- continue to work within industry associations to achieve alignment on climate policies;
- release a statement on Rio Tinto's principles and processes that underpin our engagements with industry associations;
- provide additional reporting to show which industry groups we have engaged on climate policy issues, and identify where our position differs from the industry group's public position; and
- identify opportunities to broaden industry associations' engagements to include relevant shareholders, investors and non-government organisations including civil society.

Recommendation

For the reasons set out above, the board has formed the view that the resolution is not in the interests of shareholders or of Rio Tinto as a whole and therefore recommends that shareholders **vote against resolution 20**.

The chairman of the meeting intends to vote undirected proxies **against** resolution 20.

Appendix – Statements provided by requisitioning members

The requisitioning shareholders have requested, pursuant to section 249P of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 that the following statements in relation to resolutions 19 and 20, set out below, be provided to shareholders.

By publishing the statements, Rio Tinto does not make any representations as to their truth or accuracy and disclaims any liability for their contents.

Statement by the requisitioning members in support of resolution 19

Supporting statement to resolution 19 (special resolution)¹

Shareholder resolutions are a healthy part of corporate democracy in many jurisdictions other than Australia.

The Constitution of our company is not conducive to the right of shareholders to place ordinary resolutions on the agenda of an AGM. In our view, this is contrary to the long-term interests of our company, our company's Board, and all shareholders in our company.

Shareholders in the United Kingdom have successfully proposed resolutions directing the board to provide additional information in routine annual reporting on the impact of climate change on the company in question, including our company's UK-listed entity, Rio Tinto plc.² Known as the 'Aiming for A' shareholder resolutions³, each was supported by management and a large group of institutional investors, and accordingly passed with well near unanimous support from shareholders with voting rights.⁴ The 'Aiming for A' resolutions have inspired investors around the world to exercise their legal rights to drive better governance on climate change.

Australian legislation and its interpretation in case law means that Australian shareholders are unable to directly propose an ordinary resolution similar to the 'Aiming for A' resolutions for consideration at Australian companies' AGMs. In Australia, the *Corporations Act 2001* provides that 100 shareholders or those with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at an AGM with the right to propose a resolution.⁵ However, section 198A specifically provides that management powers in a company reside with the Board.⁶

Case law in Australia has determined that these provisions, together with the common law, mean that shareholders cannot by ordinary resolution either direct that the company take a course of action, or express an opinion as to how a power vested by the company's constitution in the directors should be exercised.⁷

Australian shareholders wishing to have an ordinary resolution considered at an AGM have dealt with this limitation by proposing two part resolutions, with the first being a 'special resolution,' such as this one, that amends the company's constitution to allow ordinary resolutions to be placed on the agenda at a company's AGM. A special resolution requires 75% support to pass, and as no resolution of this kind has ever been supported by management or any institutional investors, none have succeeded.

We note that the drafting of our resolution limits the scope of permissible advisory resolutions to those related to "an issue of material relevance to the company or the company's business as identified by the company" and that recruiting 100 individual shareholders in a company to support a resolution is by no means an easy or straightforward task. Both of these factors act as powerful barriers to the actualisation of any concern that such a mechanism could 'open the floodgates' to a large number of frivolous resolutions.

It is open to our company's Board to simply permit the filing of ordinary resolutions, without the need for a special resolution. We would welcome this, in

¹ Much of this information is taken from an Investor Briefing drafted by ClientEarth, a UK charity, available at <https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-info/investor-briefing-uk-v-australian-shareholder-rights-feb-2018/>. ClientEarth assisted institutional investors to file the Aiming for A resolutions from 2014-16.

² See <https://shareaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/InvestorReport-AimingForA-Shell.pdf>

³ Filed with Royal Dutch Shell and BP in 2015 and Anglo American, Rio Tinto and Glencore in 2016. As Rio Tinto is dual listed it also included the Aiming for A resolution on the ballot at its 2016 Australian AGM, held in Brisbane. Although this was not technically required, the company stated that it did so in order to ensure equality of rights between all of its shareholders.

⁴ Each resolution passed with well above the 75% threshold required to make the resolution a 'special resolution' that now forms part of each company's constitution (section 17 Companies Act 2006).

⁵ sections 249D and 249N of the *Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)*

⁶ S198A provides that "[t]he business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors", and that "[t]he directors may exercise all the powers of the company except any powers that this Act or the company's constitution (if any) requires the company to exercise in general meeting."

⁷ *National Roads & Motorists' Association v Parker* (1986) 6 NSWLR 517; *ACCR v CBA* [2015] FCA 785). Parker turned on whether the resolution would be legally effective, with *ACCR v CBA* [2016] FCAFC 80 following this precedent on the basis that expressing an opinion would be legally ineffective as it would usurp the power vested in the directors to manage the corporation.

this instance. Permitting the raising of advisory resolutions by ordinary resolution at a company's AGM is global best practice, and this right is enjoyed by shareholders in any listed company in the UK, US, Canada or New Zealand. Our fellow shareholders in Rio Tinto Plc already enjoy this right, and have used it to propose, with Board support, the 'Aiming for A' resolutions.⁸

The Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR), Local Government Super, the Church of England Pensions Board, and the Seventh Swedish National Pension Fund (AP7) urge shareholders to vote for this proposal.

Statement by the requisitioning members in support of resolution 20

Supporting statement to resolution 20 (ordinary resolution)

As shareholders, the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR) and co-filing institutions favour policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of our investments.

The last decade of Australian climate and energy policy has been characterised by short-lived policy subject to relentless scrutiny and adversarial campaigning by industry bodies, or no policy at all. Globally, many investors are deeply concerned about existing and future effects of climate change on society, business and our economy.

Accordingly, we urge companies in the mining and energy sector to review their relationships with industry bodies that act as blockages to progress towards the effective uptake of national and global climate and energy frameworks aimed at preventing a >2°C world.

In respect of Australian national policy, we question the long-term attractiveness to shareholders of our company's public policy advocacy through the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA)⁹, the NSW Minerals Council (NSWMC) and the Queensland Resources Council (QRC). All three of these organisations' activities have diminished government's ability to resolve national policy issues of material relevance to our company and the stability of its operations. For example:

- The MCA, the NSWMC and the QRC have each lobbied for government policy and financing support for the construction of new coal-fired power generation,¹⁰ although any new coal-fired power generation would be inconsistent with Australia meeting its Paris Agreement commitments.¹¹
- In 2016/17 the MCA and a related entity ACA Low Emissions Technology¹² accounted for 45% of all declared third-party political expenditure in Australia (\$4.9m), expenditure which was made largely on advertising campaigns promoting thermal coal.¹³
- The MCA is vocal about their successful advocacy leading to the abolition of Australia's short-lived carbon price, in their own words, being "at the forefront of the debates over the carbon and mining taxes" and claiming that "their

abolition [was] in no small part due to the [MCA]'s determined advocacy on both issues."¹⁴

- It is widely accepted that the MCA was instrumental in the abandonment of a Clean Energy Target, recommended by Australia's Chief Scientist Alan Finkel to provide policy certainty to the Australian energy market in 2017.¹⁵

Globally, our company's memberships of other Relevant Industry Associations should also be reviewed. Such a review should, for example, include:

- The US Chamber of Commerce (USCC)¹⁶ which, in 2017, sponsored research¹⁷ that was used by Trump Administration to justify pulling the US out of the Paris Climate Agreement,¹⁸ has also vocally supported the roll back of various Obama-era climate regulation in the US.¹⁹ In particular, USCC has strongly supported moves to repeal of the US Clean Power Plan,²⁰ having lead a coalition of trade associations legally opposing the rule between 2015-2016.²¹
- The Mining Association of Canada (MAC)²² which, in 2017, downplayed the importance of reducing emissions in Canada²³ and, despite stating support for support for "effective climate change policies",²⁴ has warned against policies that do not protect emission-intensive sectors from carbon leakage.²⁵ In 2016, MAC endorsed emission trading policy in Canada but under a number of conditions.²⁶ MAC has also supported tax credits schemes for the mining sector in Canada that cover coal production.²⁷
- The Chamber of Mines of South Africa (CMSA)²⁸, which has lobbied in opposition of significant emission reductions in South Africa.²⁹ CMSA advocates for a "competitive policy and regulatory environment" to boost the South African coal sector³⁰ and is a prominent opponent of the proposed carbon tax, lobbying in 2016 for a five-year delay of its introduction.³¹ In 2017, CMSA argued that diesel subsidies should be escalated rather than withdrawn to improve the competitiveness of the mining sector.³²

We emphasise our support for our company's leadership's commitment to being 'part of the solution' on climate change.³³ However, the activities of trade associations of which our company is a member stand in conflict with this commitment and our company's long term financial and strategic interests, especially given our company's exit from its thermal coal business,³⁴ and have the potential to undermine shareholder value over time, given our company's exposure to climate-related risk and energy instability.

Our company's membership of Relevant Industry Associations should therefore be reviewed in light of those Associations' positions, with a view to establishing criteria for discontinuing memberships that have not promoted our company's interests.

The Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility, Local Government Super, the Church of England Pensions Board, and the Seventh Swedish National Pension Fund (AP7) urge shareholders to vote for this proposal.

⁸ no footnote provided

⁹ See analysis of MCA on InfluenceMap, <https://influencemap.org/influencer/Minerals-Council-of-Australia-MCA>

¹⁰ See <http://www.afr.com/business/energy/dont-buy-the-minerals-council-costings-of-coal-power-20170705-qx5enx> (MCA); also <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/nsw-minerals-council-pushes-for-more-funding-for-clean-coal-technologies/newsstory/%201a37d858e03cd20432b3ab45863d2b97> (NSWMC); also <https://www.qrc.org.au/media-releases/new-coal-technology-part-lmps-approach/> and <http://www.afr.com/news/politics/australia-needs-for-three-new-coalfired-power-plants-says-mining-lobby-20170705-qx4vfm> (QRC)

¹¹ See http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/resources/TCL_A-Switch-In-Time_Final.pdf

¹² See http://www.minerals.org.au/resources/coal21/about_coal21

¹³ See <http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/SummaryPoliticalExpenditure.aspx>

¹⁴ MCA 2013 Annual report, see http://www.minerals.org.au/news/2013_annual_report_minerals_council_of_australia

¹⁵ See <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/nsw/minerals-council-steps-up-coal-lobbying-as-aql-calls-for-end-to-political-gridlock-20170619-gwu60q.html>; <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/industry-pushes-for-clean-energy-target/newsstory/aaad1fc9508f48d2033e616d9e213cb6>; www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/josh-frydenberg-set-to-dump-clean-energytarget/news-story/1907744fcc26ed4cf113b59314c33406 also www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/P440%20MCA%20membership%20and%20coal%20FINAL_0.pdf

¹⁶ See analysis of USCC on InfluenceMap, <https://influencemap.org/influencer/US-Chamber-of-Commerce/projectlink/US-Chamber-of-Commerce-In-Climate-Change>

¹⁷ See <https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/new-report-examines-costs-us-industrial-sector-obama-s-paris-pledge>

¹⁸ See <https://www.bloomberglaw.com/news/articles/2017-06-09/paris-pullout-pits-chamber-against-some-of-its-biggest-members>

¹⁹ See <https://www.uschamber.com/series/your-corner/clearing-the-way-energy-innovators>

²⁰ See <https://www.uschamber.com/series/your-corner/historic-moment-us-energy>

²¹ See <http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/chamber-commerce-et-al-v-epa-esps-rule>

²² See analysis of MAC on InfluenceMap, <https://influencemap.org/influencer/Mining-Association-of-Canada>

²³ MAC 2016 Facts and Figures Report, February 2017, p.65, see <http://mining.ca/documents/facts-and-figures-2016>

²⁴ See <http://mining.ca/news-events/press-releases/foundational-policies-can-lead-bright-future-canada%E2%80%99s-mineral-and-mining>

²⁵ See <https://www.northernontariobusiness.com/industry-news/mining/mining-association-not-feeling-bubbly-about-rebound-538243>

²⁶ MAC 2016 Report, Principles for Climate Change Policy Design, April 2016, see <http://mining.ca/news-events/press-releases/mining-industry-supports-carbon-price-address-climate-change>

²⁷ MAC 2016 Facts and Figures Report, February 2017, p.16, see <http://mining.ca/documents/facts-and-figures-2016>

²⁸ See analysis of CMSA on InfluenceMap, <https://influencemap.org/influencer/South-African-Chamber-of-Mines-d9fecc0ed7db4a809c71f3fc6a2b0cd6>

²⁹ CMSA Presentation to the Davis Tax Committee, May 2015, see www.taxcom.org.za/docs/New_Folder2/Chamber%20of%20Mines%20carbon%20tax%20presentation%20to%20DTC.pdf

³⁰ See http://www.miningweekly.com/article/chamber-of-mines-calls-for-policy-certainty-in-the-coal-sector-2016-02-05/rep_id:3650

³¹ CMSA Chief Executive Roger Baxter Presentation, The Regulatory Environment and Its Effect On Coal Mine Development, February 2016, p.17, see <http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-news/publications/presentations/send/7-2015/185-the-regulatory-environment-and-its-effect-on-coal-mine-development>

³² CMSA 2016 Annual Report, May 2017 p. 25, see <http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-news/publications/annual-reports>

³³ See <http://www.riotinto.com/ourcommitment/climate-change-21469.aspx>

³⁴ See <http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/rio-tinto-soon-to-go-coal-free-20171110-gzim1o.html>